Király wrote:
The majority of people don't know how to do that, let alone why they might want to.
I do that, in fact Apple advises us to to exactly that. Running all the time as an admin user hands admin privileges to every app and process you run; privileges those apps don't need and shouldn't have.
I don't know that Apple advices us to do that, a quick Google search doesn't find anything immediately suggesting this. The knowledge base articles that do turn up, such as this one, all seem to mention that you shouldn't use auto-login for an administrator account, though, but that's far from that advice.
Even if they do advise using this setup somewhere, then how does that possibly make any difference when
- You'd have to go look for this advice yourself
- The setup wizard that runs on your Mac does not set this up, nor does it mention that you might want to
Why do you think you need to switch users? I do admin and root tasks from my non-admin account all the time simply by supplying the admin user's username and password when prompted. No switching to the admin account is necessary. It's probably been at least a year since I actually logged in to the admin account.
Well, for me, I the shell more than I use the GUI. I do tons of stuff that needs root access, and having to do that by first su'ing to my administrator user and then sudo'ing on from there would just plain suck. Then there's the issue of file permissions while I'd be shelling as either daniel:staff or standarddaniel:whatevergroupthatwouldbe. Neither would be able to mess with each other's files, so combining coding in the GUI as the standard user with having to be the admin user in an elevated shell prompt (where if I didn't want to be constantly switching users, I'd have to have duplicate setups of zsh and all other terminal-y stuff like brew and go and tools and credentials for accessing rackspace and AWS, ssh keys for logging in to our corporate servers, etc. ad nauseum), I'd have to deal with file permissions all day long as well.
Even if that setup could be made semi-trivial, it doesn't change the fact that it doesn't have to be like that. Every Linux distro I've used (and tested, including those two falsely claimed to behave otherwise by that other fella) don't have this insecure configuration and work just splendidly in terms of security out-of-the-box.
And again, even if you using that setup isn't a hassle for you, that's not the point: It's just not the setup that practically every Mac user is using. Sorry if I sound pedantic (still a little worked up about the other guy just lying to me to win some kind of argument I wasn't actually trying to make), but it's just irrelevant that it's not a really big hassle to reconfigure your Mac to not be vulnerable to attacks exploiting this ill-thought-of default configuration. It's like asking someone using Windows when a zero-day exploit in the networking stack is discovered, "Why aren't you just using OS X instead? It's just as easy, if not easier to use, and it has all the apps you use?" There are valid points in that question, it's just not relevant to a discussion about the exploit itself.
Yes I agree about your security concerns with sudo, but that's what you get when you run all the time as an admin user. The solution is just to stop unnecessarily handing admin rights to apps and processes that don't need them; i.e. stop running all the time as admin.
No. That's what you get when you run all the time as an admin user on OS X. No other OS that I've tried, including Windows, has an exploitable configuration like this.
And again, how is this relevant? Is anyone in your family running OS X? Your mother or father, perhaps? Your friends? Have they set up their systems like you? Does it matter to you that they're vulnerable to this unfortunate exploitable default configuration? I'm not worried about me (well, a little bit, I'm worried that it might already have been exploited) — I'm worried about my friends, family and colleagues. This is the way the default user session runs on every Mac out there.
I totally agree with the points that running as a different user than the default would exempt you from being vulnerable to attacks exploiting this behavior, I just don't see how to get from that to "then this isn't a problem."
Cheers,
Daniel