I'm not sure if it's strictly a Mac virus/Trojan, or it will park itself on any Bluetooth device it can.
Here's a bit more on Opener. You can see how much damage it can do. Turns off your Firewall and hides itself, among other things.
I should clarify that I'm guessing you have Opener on your Mac since it's the only key logger I know of. You could try the free
ClamXav. It may be able to detect and remove Opener.
Edit: According to Symantec's site, Opener can only run on OS X. Meaning it shouldn't be able to copy itself to a Bluetooth enabled phone and then to a Mac with Bluetooth open. Below is the text from Symantec's site on everything Opener can do.
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When the virus is executed, it does the following:
Deletes some UNIX commands and modifies preferences for other additional commands.
Launches a keystroke-mapping application (if installed) called Krec, to record the keyboard entry of passwords.
Modifies the hostconfig file, allowing Write access to all users and SSH access from the intruder's computer.
Gathers hash files (mathematical strings used to represent passwords and other sensitive data) to scan for passwords for every user, compares these hash files to a dictionary file to try to generate the appropriate passwords.
Turns on file sharing and remote login, then puts passwords and other sensitive data into an invisible folder named .info on each user's Public folder.
When active, the Activity Monitor shows a process called "john" eating almost an entire processor.
Requires one or more of the following to install this script and to copy itself to the startup items folder:
Admin or physical access (boot from a CD or firewire/usb, ignore permissions on the internal drive).
Write access to either /Library/StartupItems /System/Library/StartupItems.
Write access to any existing StartupItem (which is replaced with this script).
Write access to the rc, crontab, or periodic files.
Creates the startup item /System/Library/StartupItems named "opener."
Runs "john" (we assume as in "the Ripper").
Turns on some services and turns off others (including firewall services).
Runs as root, as no "sudo" commands are needed.
Copies itself to any mounted startup volume, before it kills utmp. When the virus connects, it is invisible to the user.
Note: The utmp file allows one to discover information about who is currently using the system. There may be more users currently using the system, because not all programs use utmp logging.
After disabling the Macintosh OS firewall, it changes the File Server preferences to make sure the Mac File Server does not log any Mac File Sharing.
Prevents Software update from auto-updating.
Looks for LittleSnitch software (a shareware Firewall program with application control) and tries to terminate the process, when LittleSnitch attempts to perform network access.
Searches throughout the computer for the following:
Serial numbers of installed applications.
Various preference files of installed applications.
Various user-specific preferences, including Classic files.
Modifies the LimeWire settings, deletes log files, and creates an admin level user named:
"LDAP-daemon"
so the machine can then be accessed in the future by a hacker who knows about this script. This user name will appear in the NetInfo Manager.
Installs a daily script to look for more passwords on the system that runs at 3 A.M.
Installs and runs two programs named:
"John the Ripper"
"dsniff"
which will gather data and attempt to isolate passwords contained within them, as well as any other 10.2 and 10.3 hashes.
Gathers data and attempts to isolate passwords contained within them, as well as any other 10.2 and 10.3 hashes.
Reviews the logs for any passwords found.
There appears to be no attempt by the script to send the passwords to an email address or FTP site. However, the computer's state is compromised to the extent that anyone with knowledge of the script could login and access the log files containing serial numbers and passwords.
Recommendations
Symantec Security Response encourages all users and administrators to adhere to the following basic security "best practices":
Turn off and remove unneeded services. By default, many operating systems install auxiliary services that are not critical, such as an FTP server, telnet, and a Web server. These services are avenues of attack. If they are removed, blended threats have less avenues of attack and you have fewer services to maintain through patch updates.
If a blended threat exploits one or more network services, disable, or block access to, those services until a patch is applied.
Always keep your patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and are accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services (for example, all Windows-based computers should have the current Service Pack installed.). Additionally, please apply any security updates that are mentioned in this writeup, in trusted Security Bulletins, or on vendor Web sites.
Enforce a password policy. Complex passwords make it difficult to crack password files on compromised computers. This helps to prevent or limit damage when a computer is compromised.
Configure your email server to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used to spread viruses, such as .vbs, .bat, .exe, .pif and .scr files.
Isolate infected computers quickly to prevent further compromising your organization. Perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
Train employees not to open attachments unless they are expecting them. Also, do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has been scanned for viruses. Simply visiting a compromised Web site can cause infection if certain browser vulnerabilities are not patched.
Writeup By: Yana Liu
