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What is crashing in my Macbook Pro

I have this new MacBook Pro - Yosemite and it has been crashing about once a week. What exactly that triggering the crash ? It blacks out then the message of ... press anything key to restart screen. I looked at the Utility-Console and seeing plenty of logs and warning. This one stands out and I am wondering if it was the culprit or simply a victim of the crash. This one from my Symantec Internet Security software. Anyone know how to find out what triggering my crashes ?


T.I.A.


Process: SymDaemon [73]

Path: /Library/Application Support/Symantec/*/SymDaemon.bundle/Contents/MacOS/SymDaemon

Identifier: SymDaemon

Version: 5.4 (9)

Code Type: X86-64 (Native)

Parent Process: launchd [1]

Responsible: SymDaemon [73]

User ID: 0

Date/Time: 2015-07-19 14:24:04.772 -0600

OS Version: Mac OS X 10.10.4 (14E46)

Report Version: 11

Anonymous UUID: F1DEE17F-6CE1-2881-20CB-19E5A06A1510

Time Awake Since Boot: 9 seconds

Crashed Thread: 3 Dispatch queue: com.symantec.personalfirewall-daemon

Exception Type: EXC_BAD_ACCESS (SIGSEGV)

Exception Codes: KERN_INVALID_ADDRESS at 0x0000000000000028

VM Regions Near 0x28:

-->







External Modification Summary:

Calls made by other processes targeting this process:

task_for_pid: 1

thread_create: 0

thread_set_state: 0

Calls made by this process:

task_for_pid: 0

thread_create: 0

thread_set_state: 0

Calls made by all processes on this machine:

task_for_pid: 169

thread_create: 0

thread_set_state: 0


-->

__TEXT 0000000100000000-0000000100026000 [ 152K] r-x/rwx SM=COW /Library/Application Support/Symantec/*/SymDaemon.bundle/Contents/MacOS/SymDaemon



Application Specific Information:

/Library/Application Support/Symantec/Daemon/SymDaemon.bundle/Contents/PlugIns/SymAutoBlock.bundle/C ontents/MacOS/SymAutoBlock



Thread 0:: Dispatch queue: com.apple.main-thread

0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x00007fff966b1532 semaphore_timedwait_trap + 10

1 libdispatch.dylib 0x00007fff8d1dbc0f _dispatch_semaphore_wait_slow + 143

2 com.symantec.daemon 0x000000010000229d 0x100000000 + 8861

3 com.symantec.daemon 0x000000010000239b 0x100000000 + 9115

4 com.symantec.daemon 0x0000000100005fa6 main + 67

5 com.symantec.daemon 0x00000001000021e0 0x100000000 + 8672



Thread 1:: Dispatch queue: com.apple.libdispatch-manager

0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x00007fff966b7232 kevent64 + 10

1 libdispatch.dylib 0x00007fff8d1d7a6a _dispatch_mgr_thread + 52



Thread 2:: Dispatch queue: com.apple.root.utility-qos

0 libsystem_c.dylib 0x00007fff8ea66af9 tre_stack_push + 124

1 libsystem_c.dylib 0x00007fff8ea5ae4f tre_compile + 1171

2 libsystem_c.dylib 0x00007fff8ea5a056 regncomp_l + 325

3 com.apple.security 0x00007fff8adba2ac Security::CodeSigning::ResourceBuilder::Rule::Rule(std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > const&, unsigned int, unsigned int) + 74

4 com.apple.security 0x00007fff8ad97fdc Security::CodeSigning::DirValidator::Rule::Rule(std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > const&, unsigned int, std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > (std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > const&, std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > const&) block_pointer) + 24

5 com.apple.security 0x00007fff8ad9b950 Security::CodeSigning::DirValidator::allow(std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > const&, unsigned int, std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > (std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > const&, std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > const&) block_pointer) + 56

6 com.apple.security 0x00007fff8ad98579 Security::CodeSigning::BundleDiskRep::setup(Security::CodeSigning::DiskRep::Con text const*) + 473

7 com.apple.security 0x00007fff8ad993ad Security::CodeSigning::BundleDiskRep::BundleDiskRep(__CFBundle*, Security::CodeSigning::DiskRep::Context const*) + 219

8 com.apple.security 0x00007fff8ada2477 Security::CodeSigning::DiskRep::bestGuess(char const*, Security::CodeSigning::DiskRep::Context const*) + 207


[ a lot of other contents ......]


VM Region Summary:

ReadOnly portion of Libraries: Total=215.6M resident=197.0M(91%) swapped_out_or_unallocated=18.6M(9%)

Writable regions: Total=105.2M written=2056K(2%) resident=4872K(5%) swapped_out=0K(0%) unallocated=100.4M(95%)


REGION TYPE VIRTUAL

=========== =======

Dispatch continuations 16.0M

Kernel Alloc Once 8K

MALLOC 72.3M

MALLOC (admin) 32K

STACK GUARD 56.1M

Stack 16.2M

VM_ALLOCATE 40K

__DATA 20.2M

__IMAGE 528K

__LINKEDIT 72.1M

__TEXT 143.5M

__UNICODE 552K

mapped file 23.4M

shared memory 4K

=========== =======

TOTAL 421.0M





System Profile:

AirPort: spairport_wireless_card_type_airport_extreme (0x14E4, 0x134), Broadcom BCM43xx 1.0 (7.15.166.24.3)

Bluetooth: Version 4.3.5f8 15969, 3 services, 27 devices, 1 incoming serial ports

Thunderbolt Bus: MacBook Pro, Apple Inc., 17.1

Memory Module: BANK 0/DIMM0, 8 GB, DDR3, 1600 MHz, 0x80AD, 0x484D54343147533641465238412D50422020

Memory Module: BANK 1/DIMM0, 8 GB, DDR3, 1600 MHz, 0x80AD, 0x484D54343147533641465238412D50422020

USB Device: Internal Memory Card Reader

USB Device: BRCM20702 Hub

USB Device: Bluetooth USB Host Controller

USB Device: Apple Internal Keyboard / Trackpad

USB Device: USB 2.0 Hub [MTT]

USB Device: USB Receiver

Serial ATA Device: APPLE SSD SM0512F, 500.28 GB

Model: MacBookPro11,3, BootROM MBP112.0138.B15, 4 processors, Intel Core i7, 2.5 GHz, 16 GB, SMC 2.19f12

Network Service: Wi-Fi, AirPort, en0

Graphics: Intel Iris Pro, Intel Iris Pro, Built-In

Graphics: NVIDIA GeForce GT 750M, NVIDIA GeForce GT 750M, PCIe, 2048 MB

MacBook Pro with Retina display, OS X Yosemite (10.10)

Posted on Jul 20, 2015 7:11 PM

Reply
Question marked as Best reply

Posted on Jul 20, 2015 7:43 PM

Remove the Norton/Symantec product by following these instructions. If you have a different version of the product, the procedure may be different.

Back up all data before making any changes. Never install any commercial "anti-virus" or "anti-malware" product again.

3 replies

Jul 20, 2015 8:26 PM in response to iaskmac

Mac users often ask whether they should install "anti-virus" (AV) or "anti-malware" software. The short answer is "no," but that answer may give the wrong impression that there is no threat from what are loosely called "viruses." There is a threat, and you need to be aware of it.

1. This is a comment on what you should—and should not—do to protect yourself from malicious software ("malware") that circulates on the Internet and gets onto a computer as an unintended consequence of the user's actions.

It does not apply to software, such as keystroke loggers, that may be installed deliberately by an intruder who has hands-on access to the computer, or who has been able to take control of it remotely. That threat is in a different category, and there's no easy way to defend against it. AV software is not intended to, and does not, defend against such attacks.

The comment is long because the issue is complex. The key points are in sections 5 and 11.

OS X now implements three layers of built-in protection specifically against malware, not counting runtime protections such as execute disable, sandboxing, system integrity protection, system library randomization, and address space layout randomization that may also guard against other kinds of exploits.

2. All versions of OS X since 10.6.7 have been able to detect known Mac malware in downloaded files, and to block insecure web plugins. This feature is transparent to the user. Internally Apple calls it "XProtect."

The malware recognition database used by XProtect is automatically updated; however, you shouldn't rely on it, because the attackers are always at least a day ahead of the defenders.

The following caveats apply to XProtect:

☞ It can be bypassed by some third-party networking software, such as BitTorrent clients and Java applets.

☞ It only applies to software downloaded from the network. Software installed from a CD or other media is not checked.

As new versions of OS X are released, it's not clear whether Apple will indefinitely continue to maintain the XProtect database of older versions such as 10.6. The security of obsolete system versions may eventually be degraded. Security updates to the code of obsolete systems will stop being released at some point, and that may leave them open to other kinds of attack besides malware.

3. Starting with OS X 10.7.5, there has been a second layer of built-in malware protection, designated "Gatekeeper" by Apple. By default, applications and Installer packages downloaded from the network will only run if they're digitally signed by a developer with a certificate issued by Apple. Software certified in this way hasn't been checked for security by Apple unless it comes from the App Store, but you can be reasonably sure that it hasn't been modified by anyone other than the developer. His identity is known to Apple, so he could be held legally responsible if he distributed malware. That may not mean much if the developer lives in a country with a weak legal system (see below.)

Gatekeeper doesn't depend on a database of known malware. It has, however, the same limitations as XProtect, and in addition the following:

☞ It can easily be disabled or overridden by the user.

☞ A malware attacker could get control of a code-signing certificate under false pretenses, or could simply ignore the consequences of distributing codesigned malware.

☞ An App Store developer could find a way to bypass Apple's oversight, or the oversight could fail due to human error.

Apple has taken far too long to revoke the codesigning certificates of some known abusers, thereby diluting the value of Gatekeeper and the Developer ID program. Those lapses don't involve App Store products, however.

For the reasons given, App Store products, and—to a lesser extent—other applications recognized by Gatekeeper as signed, are safer than others, but they can't be considered absolutely safe. "Sandboxed" applications may prompt for access to private data, such as your contacts, or for access to the network. Think before granting that access. Sandbox security is based on user input. Never click through any request for authorization without thinking.

4. Starting with OS X 10.8.3, a third layer of protection has been added: a "Malware Removal Tool" (MRT). MRT runs automatically in the background when you update the OS. It checks for, and removes, malware that may have evaded the other protections via a Java exploit (see below.) MRT also runs when you install or update the Apple-supplied Java runtime (but not the Oracle runtime.) Like XProtect, MRT is effective against known threats, but not against unknown ones. It notifies you if it finds malware, but otherwise there's no user interface to MRT.

5. The built-in security features of OS X reduce the risk of malware attack, but they are not, and never will be, complete protection. Malware is a problem of human behavior, not machine behavior, and no technological fix alone is going to solve it. Trusting software to protect you will only make you more vulnerable.

The best defense is always going to be your own intelligence. With the possible exception of Java exploits, all known malware circulating on the Internet that affects a fully-updated installation of OS X 10.6 or later takes the form of so-called "Trojan horses," which can only have an effect if the victim is duped into running them. The threat therefore amounts to a battle of wits between you and Internet criminals. If you're better informed than they think you are, you'll win. That means, in effect, that you always stay within a safe harbor of computing practices. How do you know when you're leaving the safe harbor? Below are some warning signs of danger.

Software from an untrustworthy source

☞ Software with a corporate brand, such as Adobe Flash Player, doesn't come directly from the developer’s website. Do not trust an alert from any website to update Flash, or your browser, or any other software. A genuine alert that Flash is outdated and blocked is shown on this support page. Follow the instructions on the support page in that case. Otherwise, assume that the alert is fake and someone is trying to scam you into installing malware. If you see such alerts on more than one website, ask for instructions.

☞ Software of any kind is distributed via BitTorrent, or Usenet, or on a website that also distributes pirated music or movies.

☞ Rogue websites such as Softonic, Soft32, CNET Download, and SourceForge distribute free applications that have been packaged in a superfluous "installer."

☞ The software is advertised by means of spam or intrusive web ads. Any ad, on any site, that includes a direct link to a download should be ignored.

Software that is plainly illegal or does something illegal

☞ High-priced commercial software such as Photoshop is "cracked" or "free."

☞ An application helps you to infringe copyright, for instance by circumventing the copy protection on commercial software, or saving streamed media for reuse without permission. All "YouTube downloaders" are in this category, though not all are necessarily malicious.

Conditional or unsolicited offers from strangers

☞ A telephone caller or a web page tells you that you have a “virus” and offers to help you remove it. (Some reputable websites did legitimately warn visitors who were infected with the "DNSChanger" malware. That exception to this rule no longer applies.)

☞ A web site offers free content such as video or music, but to use it you must install a “codec,” “plug-in,” "player," "downloader," "extractor," or “certificate” that comes from that same site, or an unknown one.

☞ You win a prize in a contest you never entered.

☞ Someone on a message board such as this one is eager to help you, but only if you download an application of his choosing.

☞ A "FREE WI-FI !!!" network advertises itself in a public place such as an airport, but is not provided by the management.

☞ Anything online that you would expect to pay for is "free."

Unexpected events

☞ A file is downloaded automatically when you visit a web page, with no other action on your part. Delete any such file without opening it.

☞ You open what you think is a document and get an alert that it's "an application downloaded from the Internet." Click Cancel and delete the file. Even if you don't get the alert, you should still delete any file that isn't what you expected it to be.

☞ An application does something you don't expect, such as asking for permission to access your contacts, your location, or the Internet for no obvious reason.

☞ Software is attached to email that you didn't request, even if it comes (or seems to come) from someone you trust.

I don't say that leaving the safe harbor just once will necessarily result in disaster, but making a habit of it will weaken your defenses against malware attack. Any of the above scenarios should, at the very least, make you uncomfortable.

6. Java on the Web (not to be confused with JavaScript, to which it's not related, despite the similarity of the names) is a weak point in the security of any system. Java is, among other things, a platform for running complex applications in a web page. That was always a bad idea, and Java's developers have proven themselves incapable of implementing it without also creating a portal for malware to enter. Past Java exploits are the closest thing there has ever been to a Windows-style virus affecting OS X. Merely loading a page with malicious Java content could be harmful.

Fortunately, client-side Java on the Web is obsolete and mostly extinct. Only a few outmoded sites still use it. Try to hasten the process of extinction by avoiding those sites, if you have a choice. Forget about playing games or other non-essential uses of Java.

Java is not included in OS X 10.7 and later. Discrete Java installers are distributed by Apple and by Oracle (the developer of Java.) Don't use either one unless you need it. Most people don't. If Java is installed, disable itnot JavaScript—in your browsers.

Regardless of version, experience has shown that Java on the Web can't be trusted. If you must use a Java applet for a task on a specific site, enable Java only for that site in Safari. Never enable Java for a public website that carries third-party advertising. Use it only on well-known, login-protected, secure websites without ads. In Safari 6 or later, you'll see a padlock icon in the address bar when visiting a secure site.

7. Another perennial weak point is Adobe Flash Player. Like Java, Flash is in well-deserved decline, but Flash content is still much more widespread than Java content on the Web. If you choose to install the Flash plugin, consider limiting your exposure to Flash by installing a Safari extension such as "ClickToFlash" or "ClickToPlugin." I've tested those extensions and found them safe, but you should always do your own research before deciding whether to trust any third-party software.

8. Stay within the safe harbor, and you’ll be as safe from malware as you can practically be. The rest of this comment concerns what you should not do to protect yourself.

Never install any AV or "Internet security" products for the Mac if you have a choice, as they are all worse than useless. If you are required by a (mistaken) institutional policy to install some kind of AV, pick one of the free apps in the Mac App Store—nothing else.

Why shouldn't you use AV products?

☞ To recognize malware, the software depends on a database of known threats, which is always at least a day out of date. This technique is a proven failure, as a major AV software vendor has admitted. Most attacks are "zero-day"—that is, previously unknown. Recognition-based AV does not defend against such attacks, and the enterprise IT industry is coming to the realization that traditional AV software is worthless.

☞ The design is usually predicated on the nonexistent threat that malware may be injected at any time, anywhere in the file system. Malware is downloaded from the network; it doesn't materialize from nowhere. In order to meet that nonexistent threat, commercial AV software modifies or duplicates low-level functions of the operating system, which is a waste of resources and a common cause of instability, bugs, and poor performance.

☞ By modifying the operating system, the software may also create weaknessesthat could be exploited by malware attackers.

☞ Most importantly, a false sense of security is dangerous. That fact pertains to all AV software there will ever be, no matter what else changes.

9. A free AV product from the Mac App Store is harmless as long you don't let it delete or move any files. Ignore any warnings it may give you about "heuristics" or "phishing." Those warnings, if they're not merely false positives, refer to the text of email messages or cached web pages, not to malware.

An AV app is not needed, and can't be relied upon, for protection against OS X malware. It's useful, if at all, only for detecting Windows malware, and even for that use it's not really effective, because new Windows malware is emerging much faster than OS X malware.

Windows malware can't harm you directly (unless, of course, you use Windows.) Just don't pass it on to anyone else. A malicious attachment in email is usually easy to recognize by the name alone. An actual example:

London Terror Moovie.avi [124 spaces] Checked By Norton Antivirus.exe

You don't need software to tell you that's a Windows trojan. Software may be able to tell you which trojan it is, but who cares? In practice, there's no reason to use recognition software unless an organizational policy requires it. Windows malware is so widespread that you should assume it's in every email attachment until proven otherwise. Nevertheless, a free AV product from the App Store may serve a purpose if it satisfies an ill-informed network administrator who says you must have some kind of AV application. An App Store product won't modify the operating system; in fact, it won't do anything unless you run it.

10. It seems to be a common belief that the built-in Application Firewall acts as a barrier to infection, or prevents malware from functioning. It does neither. It blocks inbound connections to certain network services you're running, such as file sharing. It's disabled by default and you should leave it that way if you're behind a router on a private home or office network. Activate it only when you're on an untrusted network, for instance a public Wi-Fi hotspot, where you don't want to provide services. Disable any services you don't use in the Sharing preference pane. All are disabled by default.

11. As a Mac user, you don't have to live in fear that your computer may be infected every time you install software, read email, or visit a web page. But neither can you assume that you will always be safe from exploitation, no matter what you do. Navigating the Internet is like walking the streets of a big city. It can be as safe or as dangerous as you choose to make it. The greatest harm done by AV software is precisely its selling point: it makes people feel safe. They may then feel safe enough to take risks from which the software doesn't protect them. Nothing can lessen the need for safe computing practices.

What is crashing in my Macbook Pro

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