Q: Virus Protection, Fact vs. Myth

Mac users often ask what they should do to protect themselves from malicious software ("malware")—often loosely called "viruses"—and in particular, whether they should use "anti-virus" (AV) or "anti-malware" software. The short answer to the latter question is "no," but that answer may give the wrong impression that there is no threat to defend against. There is a threat.

1. This is a comment on what you should—and should not—do to avoid malware that circulates on the Internet and gets onto a computer as an unintended consequence of the user's actions.

It does not apply to software, such as keystroke loggers, that may be installed deliberately by an intruder who has hands-on access to the computer, or who has been able to take control of it remotely. That threat is in a different category, and there's no easy way to defend against it. AV software is not intended to, and does not, defend against such attacks.

The comment is long because the issue is complex. The key points are in sections 5, 6, and 12.

OS X now implements three layers of built-in protection specifically against malware, not counting runtime protections such as file quarantine, execute disable, sandboxing, system integrity protection, system library randomization, and address space layout randomization that may also guard against other kinds of exploits.

2. All versions of OS X since 10.6.7 have been able to detect known Mac malware in downloaded files, and to block insecure web plugins. This feature is transparent to the user. Internally Apple calls it "XProtect."

The malware recognition database used by XProtect is automatically updated; however, you shouldn't rely on it, because the attackers are always at least a day ahead of the defenders.

The following caveats apply to XProtect:

☞ It can be bypassed by some third-party networking software, such as BitTorrent clients and Java applets.

☞ It only applies to software downloaded from the network. Software installed from a CD or other media is not checked.

As new versions of OS X are released, it's not clear whether Apple will indefinitely continue to maintain the XProtect database of older versions such as 10.6. The security of obsolete system versions may eventually be degraded. Security updates to the code of obsolete systems will stop being released at some point, and that may leave them open to other kinds of attack besides malware.

3. Starting with OS X 10.7.5, there has been a second layer of built-in malware protection, designated "Gatekeeper" by Apple. By default, applications and Installer packages downloaded from the network will only run if they're digitally signed by a developer with a certificate issued by Apple. Software certified in this way hasn't been checked for security by Apple unless it comes from the App Store, but you can be reasonably sure that it hasn't been modified by anyone other than the developer. His identity is known to Apple, so he could be held legally responsible if he distributed malware. That may not mean much if the developer lives in a country with a weak legal system (see below.)

Gatekeeper doesn't depend on a database of known malware. It has, however, the same limitations as XProtect, and in addition the following:

☞ It can easily be disabled or overridden by the user.

☞ A malware attacker could find a way around it, or could get control of a code-signing certificate under false pretenses, or could simply ignore the consequences of distributing codesigned malware.

☞ An App Store developer could find a way to bypass Apple's oversight, or the oversight could fail due to human error.

Apple has taken far too long to revoke the codesigning certificates of some known abusers, thereby diluting the value of Gatekeeper and the Developer ID program. Those lapses don't involve App Store products, however.

For the reasons given, App Store products, and—to a lesser extent—other applications recognized by Gatekeeper as signed, are safer than others, but they can't be considered absolutely safe. "Sandboxed" applications may prompt for access to private data, such as your contacts, or for access to the network. Think before granting that access. Sandbox security is based on user input. Never click through any request for authorization without thinking.

4. Starting with OS X 10.8.3, a third layer of protection has been added: a "Malware Removal Tool" (MRT). MRT runs automatically in the background. It checks for, and removes, malware that matches a recognition database maintained by Apple. To ensure that MRT will run when that database is updated, open the App Store pane in System Preferences and check the box marked

          Install system data files and security updates

if it's not already checked.

Like XProtect, MRT is effective against known threats, but not against unknown ones. It notifies you if it finds malware, but otherwise it has no user interface.

5. The built-in security features of OS X reduce the risk of malware attack, but they are not, and never will be, complete protection. Malware is a problem of human behavior, not machine behavior, and no technological fix alone is going to solve it. Trusting software to protect you will only make you more vulnerable.

The best defense is always going to be your own intelligence. With the possible exception of Java exploits, all known malware circulating on the Internet that affects a fully-updated installation of OS X 10.6 or later takes the form of so-called "Trojan horses," which can only have an effect if the victim is duped into running them. The threat therefore amounts to a battle of wits between you and Internet criminals. If you're better informed than they think you are, you'll win. That means, in effect, that you always stay within a safe harbor of computing practices. How do you know when you're leaving the safe harbor? Below are some warning signs of danger.

Software from an untrustworthy source

☞ Software with a corporate brand, such as Adobe Flash Player, doesn't come directly from the developer’s website. Do not trust an alert from any website to update Flash, or your browser, or any other software. A genuine alert that Flash is outdated and blocked is shown on this support page. Follow the instructions on the support page in that case. Otherwise, assume that the alert is fake and someone is trying to scam you into installing malware. If you see such alerts on more than one website, ask for instructions.

☞ Software of any kind is distributed via BitTorrent, or Usenet, or on a website that also distributes pirated music or movies.

☞ Rogue websites such as CNET Download, MacUpdate, Soft32, Softonic, and SourceForge distribute free applications that have been packaged in a superfluous "installer."

☞ The software is advertised by means of spam or intrusive web ads. Any ad, on any site, that includes a direct link to a download should be ignored.

Software that is plainly illegal or does something illegal

☞ High-priced commercial software such as Photoshop is "cracked" or "free."

☞ An application helps you to infringe copyright, for instance by circumventing the copy protection on commercial software, or saving streamed media for reuse without permission. All "YouTube downloaders" are in this category, though not all are necessarily malicious.

Unsolicited offers or advice from strangers

☞ A telephone caller or a web page tells you that you have a “virus” and offers to help you remove it. (Some reputable websites did legitimately warn visitors who were infected with the "DNSChanger" malware. That exception to this rule no longer applies.)

☞ A web site offers free content such as video or music, but to use it you must install a “codec,” “plug-in,” "player," "downloader," "extractor," or “certificate” that comes from that same site, or an unknown one.

☞ You win a prize in a contest you never entered.

☞ A stranger on the Internet is eager for you download an unknown application.

☞ A "FREE WI-FI !!!" network advertises itself in a public place such as an airport, but is not provided by the management.

☞ Anything online that you would expect to pay for is "free."

Unexpected events

☞ A file is downloaded automatically when you visit a web page, with no other action on your part. Delete any such file without opening it.

☞ You open what you think is a document and get an alert that it's "an application downloaded from the Internet." Click Cancel and delete the file. Even if you don't get the alert, you should still delete any download that isn't what you expected it to be.

☞ An application does something you don't expect, such as asking for permission to access your contacts, your location, or the Internet for no obvious reason.

☞ Software is attached to email that you didn't request, even if it comes (or seems to come) from someone you trust.

Looking for help in all the wrong places

☞ You need technical support, so you search the Web for a term such as "Microsoft Office help," expecting to find a phone number for Microsoft. Very often, the top search hit, and maybe several of the top hits, will be one of the fake tech-support scams that infest the search engines. When you call the number, you'll be connected, not to Microsoft, but to a criminal in a country with weak law enforcement. He will ask to take remote control of your computer, and for your credit card number.

☞ The danger level is especially high if you're searching for help with a malware problem. Internet criminals know that people who have already been attacked successfully are easy marks for another attack. You'll get not just a few scams in the search results, but hundreds of them. They will all be promoting AV software.

I don't say that leaving the safe harbor just once will necessarily result in disaster, but making a habit of it will weaken your defenses against malware attack and other kinds of exploitation. Any of the above scenarios should, at the very least, make you uncomfortable.

6. The emergence of data-destroying "ransomware" for the Mac has made backing up all data a part of the defense against attack. Since an infected machine could destroy its own backups, at least one backup device must always be offline. For example, you could rotate your backup drives, keeping one with you or at another site. That strategy also protects against a physical threat such as fire or theft.

7. Java on the Web (not to be confused with JavaScript, to which it's not related, despite the similarity of the names) is a weak point in the security of any system. Java is, among other things, a platform for running complex applications in a web page. That was always a bad idea, and Java's developers have proven themselves incapable of implementing it without also creating a portal for malware to enter. Past Java exploits are the closest thing there has ever been to a Windows-style virus affecting OS X. Merely loading a page with malicious Java content could be harmful.

Fortunately, client-side Java on the Web is obsolete and mostly extinct. Only a few outmoded sites still use it. Try to hasten the process of extinction by avoiding those sites, if you have a choice. Forget about playing games or other non-essential uses of Java.

Java is not included in OS X 10.7 and later. Discrete Java installers are distributed by Apple and by Oracle (the developer of Java.) Don't use either one unless you need it. Most people don't. If Java is installed, disable it—not JavaScript—in your browsers.

Regardless of version, experience has shown that Java on the Web can't be trusted. If you must use a Java applet for a task on a specific site, enable Java only for that site in Safari. Never enable Java for a public website that carries third-party advertising. Use it only on well-known, login-protected, secure websites without ads. In Safari 6 or later, you'll see a padlock icon in the address bar when visiting a secure site.

8. Another perennial weak point is Adobe Flash Player. Like Java, Flash is in well-deserved decline, but Flash content is still much more widespread than Java content on the Web. If you choose to install the Flash plugin, you can reduce your exposure to Flash by checking the box marked

          Stop plug-ins to save power

in Advanced tab of the Safari preferences window, if it's not already checked. Consider also installing a Safari extension such as "ClickToFlash" or "ClickToPlugin." They will prevent Flash content from loading automatically, and will also cause non-Flash video to be substituted for Flash on YouTube and maybe some other sites. I've tested those extensions and found them safe, but you should always do your own research before deciding whether to trust any third-party software.

9. Stay within the safe harbor, and you’ll be as safe from malware as you can practically be. The rest of this comment concerns what you should not do to protect yourself.

Although it may seem counter-intuitive, you should never install any AV or "Internet security" products for the Mac if you have a choice, as they are all worse than useless. If you're required by a (mistaken) institutional policy to install some kind of AV, pick one of the free apps in the Mac App Store—nothing else.

Why shouldn't you use AV products?

☞ To recognize malware, the software depends on a database of known threats, which is always at least a day out of date. That technique is a proven failure, as a major AV software vendor has admitted. Most attacks are "zero-day"—that is, previously unknown. Recognition-based AV does not defend against such attacks, and the enterprise IT industry is coming to the realization that traditional AV software is worthless.

☞ The design is usually predicated on the nonexistent threat that malware may be injected at any time, anywhere in the file system. Malware is downloaded from the network; it doesn't materialize from nowhere. In order to meet that nonexistent threat, most commercial AV software modifies or duplicates low-level functions of the operating system—a common cause of instability and poor performance.

☞ By modifying the operating system, the software may also create weaknesses that could be exploited by malware attackers.

☞ Most importantly, a false sense of security is dangerous. That fact pertains to all AV software there will ever be, no matter what else changes.

Using AV software sets you up for double exploitation: by malware attackers, from whom the software doesn't protect you, and by the AV industry itself. The latter will often try to hook you with a free loss-leader product so it can charge you for "upgrades" later.

10. A free AV product from the App Store may serve a purpose if it satisfies an ill-informed network administrator who insists that you have some kind of AV application. It won't modify the operating system; in fact, it won't do anything unless you run it. It's harmless, as long as you don't make the dangerous mistake of thinking that it actually protects you, and that you don't let it delete or move any files. Ignore any warnings about "heuristics" or "phishing." Those warnings, if they're not merely false positives, refer to the text of email messages or to cached web pages, not to malware. Also ignore any attempts to sell you a paid version of the product.

The fact that a product is in the App Store does not mean that it's any good, or that it's endorsed by Apple.

An AV app is not needed, and can't be relied upon, for protection against OS X malware. It's useful, if at all, only for detecting Windows malware, and even for that use it's not really effective, because new Windows malware is emerging much faster than OS X malware.

Windows malware can't harm you directly (unless, of course, you use Windows.) Just don't pass it on to anyone else. A malicious attachment in email is usually easy to recognize by the name alone. An actual example:

     London Terror Moovie.avi [124 spaces] Checked By Norton Antivirus.exe

You don't need software to tell you that's a Windows trojan. Software may be able to tell you which trojan it is, but who cares? In practice, there's no reason to use recognition software unless an organizational policy requires it. Windows malware is so widespread that you should assume it's in every email attachment until proven otherwise.

If you're just curious as to whether a file is recognized as malware by AV engines, you can upload it to the "VirusTotal" website, where it will be tested against most of them. A negative result is no proof of anything, for the reasons stated above. I don't recommend doing this with a file that might contain private information.

11. It seems to be a common belief that the built-in Application Firewall acts as a barrier to infection, or prevents malware from functioning. It does neither. It blocks inbound connections to certain network services you're running, such as file sharing. It's disabled by default and you should leave it that way if you're behind a router on a private home or office network. Activate it only when you're on an untrusted network, for instance a public Wi-Fi hotspot, where you don't want to provide services. Disable any services you don't use in the Sharing preference pane. All are disabled by default.

12. As a Mac user, you don't have to live in fear that your computer may be infected every time you install software, read email, or visit a web page. But neither can you assume that you will always be safe, no matter what you do. Navigating the Internet is like walking the streets of a big city. It can be as safe or as dangerous as you choose to make it. The greatest harm done by AV software is precisely its selling point: it makes people feel safe. They may then feel safe enough to take risks from which the software doesn't protect them. Nothing can lessen the need for safe computing practices.