I’m delighted that we managed to identify and resolve the problem.
So good is iPadOS/iOS at protecting us from malware, Threat Actors have become very creative. As defences improve across many computing systems, a high proportion of threat now has to rely upon Social Engineering - tricking the user, one way or the other, into installing some kind of seemingly innocuous payload onto our devices - or in fooling us into exposing private or sensitive data that can be used to commit identity theft, fraud or otherwise attempt extortion or related activity.
As iOS sandboxing is so effective at protecting us from risk, one of the increasingly common methods of “infecting” our devices (I use this term in the loosest possible sense) is to create web-content, that when clicked, simply subscribes a Calendar to your system; this, of itself, is a completely valid/permitted system operation; as the “subscribing” action itself contains no malicious payload or direct exploit.
Once this calendar is subscribed (and automatically enabled), the Calendar events themselves effectively schedule appearance of unwanted “content” and notifications - often with embedded URLs that, when activated, present material that attempts further social engineering attacks from your browser. Likewise, legitimate actions can be triggered and automated within the security boundaries enforced by the OS. if other App Utilities are present on your device, these can also be triggered to aid automation of data exfiltration from your device.
As you have discovered, unless you know what to look for, the subscribed Calendar isn’t immediately obvious to many users - any more than the method by which it’s installation is triggered. Deletion of individual events isn’t possible, but once you know what to look for, recognition and removal of this exploit vector is relatively straightforward.
Use of the Content Blocker, such as 1Blocker, interferes with the initial delivery mechanism. Providing that the website (or embedded links) are included within the filter rule-set, the initial content/link is never exposed via your default (Safari) browser.
Insofar as social engineering works, content that you can neither see nor interact cannot “infect” the target system. By now, you’ll have discovered the multitude of 1Blocker blocking/filtering categories and rules, plus the flexibility of its configuration and whitelisting of sites.
Over time, you will discover some legitimate sites that require either whitelisting or refinement of the active ruleset, but you’ll soon discover how easy this is - often requiring just a few taps of a finger.
An additional defence, that costs you nothing, is to use a security-focussed Recursive DNS provider in place of your default DNS settings - the default DNS settings often being selected by your ISP. The Recursive DNS server settings can be configured on both your devices and/or WiFi Router.
Here are some recommended Recursive DNS providers:
Quad9 (recommended)
9.9.9.9
149.112.112.112
2620:fe::fe
2620:fe::9
OpenDNS
208.67.222.222
208.67.220.220
2620:0:ccc::2
2620:0:ccd::2
Cloudflare+APNIC
1.1.1.1
1.0.0.1
2606:4700:4700::1111
2606:4700:4700::1001
Use of the above DNS services will help to shield you from “known bad” websites and URLs - andwhen used alongside a good Content Blocker provides defense in depth - extending defences to include all DNS resolved network traffic.
More advanced protection can be configured using other available utilities, such as DNS Cloak, which permits use of secure DNS protocols such as DNSSEC, DoH and DoT - but this topic is perhaps beyond the immediate scope of this discussion.
I hope this additional material also proves to helpful or of interest to you.