The following differentiates VPNs used for connecting into a VPN server associated with a private organization's internal network, from commercial add-on VPN apps marketed to "protect" the first hop or three of the network connection. The former can be useful. The latter can be problematic.
Commercial VPN apps often do not do what many think they do, and can or do have features and capabilities that the VPN users might not realize or might not want. There's a reason these apps are massively advertised, too. Users' data is profitable, and VPN servers are perfectly positioned to collect and even to modify that traffic.
If you want or need protection against that first network hop and somehow cannot upgrade your connectivity to use the built-in HTTPS and SSL-related VPNs (a connection upgrade which should be implemented regardless of VPN usage), then running your own VPN server—the Streisand VPN server is one of various available examples—avoids worst of the mess at the VPN server. This approach also gets away from using the widely-known VPN credentials, which is a mess that allows for interception and decryption of the VPN traffic.
Pending any ability to load an NTP profile, use a DNS intercept for the domain. You're on a VPN. Use it. Intercept the traffic.
Leaking traffic off the VPN tends to be unpopular, and bogus time server time values do have security implications.
And yes, the VPN adds latency to the connection. Whether for sntp or otherwise.